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RELIGIOUS VICTORY OVER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT? 
 
Possible recourse for the employee of the religious employer 
 
 
 
By Jacqueline Prats* 
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In June of 2012, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act,1 commonly called the Affordable Care Act (ACA) or Obamacare.  This 
new law was meant to be a sweeping reform of the nation’s healthcare system and was fiercely 
opposed in many corners of the country.  One of the most contentious elements of the ACA 
continues to be its requirement that employers’ insurance coverage include, with no cost-
sharing,2 a concise list of preventive health services for women.3  These controversial services 
deal specifically with women’s reproductive health: any FDA-approved sterilization, 
contraception, or counseling procedure must be covered.4  As of October 2013, more than 
seventy lawsuits have been filed challenging the “contraception mandate” and seeking to stop the 
enforcement of the ACA.5  Of these, thirty-five active lawsuits have been filed by for-profit 
companies.6  This distinction is important.  For comparison, some of the other organizations that 
have filed suit include Catholic dioceses, Christian schools, and an evangelist television station.7  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
2 Cost-sharing includes any method by which an employee contributes money to his or her own 
healthcare in conjunction with his or her insurance company, including deductibles (payment of 
a certain total dollar amount out of pocket before an insurance plan begins to cover services), 
copayments (flat fees paid for each service), and co-insurance (percentages of each service’s 
fee). Small Business Majority, Cost-Sharing, http://healthcoverageguide.org/reference-
guide/benefits-providers-and-costs/cost-sharing/#Deductibles (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).  
3 These include screenings for sexually transmitted diseases, domestic violence counseling, and 
more. For a complete list of services, see U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Women’s 
Preventive Services Guidelines, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Oct. 14, 
2013). 
4 Id. 
5 The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, HHS Mandate Information Central, http://www. 
becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
6 Id.	  	  
7 E.g., Eternal World TV Network, Inc. v. Sebelius, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (a 
religious television network); Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 11-CV-03350-CMA-BNB, 
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In other words, many of the organizations wanting to stop the enforcement of the contraception 
mandate are organizations whose purposes are inherently religious.  However, these thirty-five 
for-profit plaintiffs are varied: for example, there is an air conditioner manufacturer, a natural 
food seller, and a scrap metal recycler, to name a few.8  Each hires employees of diverse faiths, 
and each has a secular purpose.  Of these thirty-five lawsuits, thirty of them have won injunctive 
relief while the cases on the merits are pending.9  
Most of the plaintiffs have requested preliminary injunctions, although a few have 
requested other measures.10  A preliminary injunction, considered an “extraordinary remedy,” 
requires four-prongs to be met: (1) that the moving party is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) 
that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; (3) that the balance of 
equities tips in the moving party’s favor; and (4) that the injunction would serve the public 
interest.11  The fact that so many injunctions have been granted is not necessarily a death knell 
for the contraception mandate.  A preliminary injunction is not a decision on the merits.  While 
the precise standard for deciding this test varies somewhat circuit to circuit,12 these decisions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2013 WL 93188 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2013) (a Christian school); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of 
N.Y. v. Sebelius, 907 F. Supp. 2d 310 (E.D. N.Y. 2012) (a Catholic diocese). 
8 Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) (a heating and air conditioning 
manufacturer); Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 1190001 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2013) (a 
natural food seller); Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 12-3459-CV-
S-RED, 2012 WL 6951316 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012) (a scrap metal recycler).	  
9 The Becket Fund, supra note 5.  
10 See, e.g., Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Colo. 2013) (denying the plaintiff’s 
request for a temporary restraining order, whose requirements mirror those for a preliminary 
injunction). 
11 Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 22 (2008).  
12 The precise standard for evaluating a motion for a preliminary injunction has, not surprisingly, 
come up in several recent decisions. For example, the Tenth Circuit is among several circuits that 
applies a “sliding scale,” where a movant’s strong showing on some prongs can lend weight to a 
weaker showing on others. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health 
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merely hold the enforcement of the mandate at bay while the merits of the claims are debated.  It 
is true that as time progresses, as more and more injunctions are granted, and as the weight of the 
decisions begins to accumulate, it looks worse and worse for supporters of the contraception 
mandate.13  However, this controversy was still very much alive as of October of 2013.  At the 
time of this writing, there was a pronounced split among the federal courts of appeal;14 this issue 
is destined to arrive at the Supreme Court.15 
This Comment examines the types of religiously motivated challenges that these 
businesses are bringing and, recognizing that the federal courts of appeal have split down the 
middle on the issue, suggests a solution for employees of the religious employers in the event 
that the plaintiffs prevail.  Part I begins with a discussion of why this issue is important to the 
public.  Then, Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of several important cases that 
have laid the foundation for modern religious freedom jurisprudence.  Having laid that 
groundwork, Part II then predicts that while each challenge will fail on its First Amendment 
claim, the claims brought under RFRA have a much better chance at succeeding.  Assuming that 
the claims under RFRA do succeed, Part III of this Comment will examine one of the ways that 
women left holding a prescription may be able to challenge their employers by using Title VII of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
& Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 394–95 (3d Cir. 2013) (Jordan, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 134 
S. Ct. 678 (2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285–1286 
(W.D. Okla. 2012).  Other circuits, notably the Third Circuit, have declined to apply this 
methodology, instead denying injunctions when the movant fails to make a strong enough 
showing on all four prongs. Conestoga, 724 F.3d 377 at 393. 
13 Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 245 
(2013). 
14 See infra Part II.A.  
15 Lyle Denniston, U.S., business appeal on birth-control mandate (UPDATED), 
SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 19, 2013, 2:29 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/09/birth-control-
mandate-issue-reaches-court/ (announcing that two petitions for writs of certiorari have been 
filed with the Supreme Court, one from the Tenth Circuit and one from the Third Circuit). 
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the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits workplace discrimination on the basis of sex.  This 
Comment predicts that while a contest under Title VII is not a guaranteed victory by any means, 
it may offer the most likely path.  
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY DOES THIS MATTER? 
At first glance, it may seem like the controversy over the mandate is a source of artificial 
outrage; after all, those affected are only a small subset within a small subset (female employees 
of non-exempt religious employers16).  However, for them (of whom there are thousands—
Hobby Lobby alone employs 13,000 full time workers, and it is only one of the companies 
fighting the contraception mandate17) cost-free access to reproductive care could be life-
changing.  
In general, preventive health services have the potential to change the way the country 
lives.  Around half of Americans die as result of “modifiable health behaviors;” this means that 
with preventive care, these Americans may have lived much longer.  In fact, a 2010 study found 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 “Non-exempt religious employers,” in this context, refers to employers with more than fifty 
employees (thus coming under the larger insurance mandate’s purview), or who otherwise offer 
comprehensive coverage, but who do not qualify for the ACA’s religious-employer exemption 
from the contraception mandate. Healthcare.gov, What if My Business Has 50 or More 
Employees? https://www.healthcare.gov/what-do-large-business-owners-need-to-know/ (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2013). Final regulations released in July of 2013 allow a religious employer who 
“(1) [h]as the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employs persons who 
share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons who share its religious tenets; and (4) is a 
nonprofit organization” to be free from the responsibility of providing contraceptive coverage to 
its employees. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 39870-1, 39873–39874 (July 2, 2013). This means that the population that could be affected 
by the challenges discussed in this Comment are the female employees (or female dependents of 
male employees) of secular, for-profit employers that employ more than fifty full-time 
employees.  
17 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 (W.D. Okla. 2012); see 
also U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat03.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (showing that women make up 
slightly less than half (about 46%) of the labor force).  
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that “an increase in the use of clinical preventive services in the United States could result in the 
saving of more than two million life-years annually.”18  Insurance co-payments, co-insurance, 
and deductible payments (collectively, “cost sharing”) reduce the likelihood that these preventive 
services will be used.19  Women are especially vulnerable to this problem; due to “reproductive 
and gender-specific conditions,” women require more preventive care than men.20  Further, 
women are less likely to be able to afford the preventive care they need; they have 
“disproportionately low wages” and suffer from a persistent wage disadvantage.21  Studies have 
shown that “even moderate copays for preventive services . . . result in fewer women obtaining 
this care.”22 
More specifically, in the realm of reproductive care, the United States has a dismal infant 
mortality rate: although it has been falling, this country still has the “highest first-day death rate 
in the industrialized world.” 23  In terms of sheer numbers, the United States loses fifty percent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Inst. of Medicine, Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps 17, 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13181 (2011) (emphasis added). 
19 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Affordable Care Act Rules on Expanding Access to 
Preventive Services for Women (Aug. 1, 2011), 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/factsheets/2011/08/ womensprevention08012011a.html. 
20 Inst. of Medicine, supra note 18, at 19.  Conditions that are of specific concern to women are 
not limited to pregnancy- and reproduction-related problems, although these are the focus of this 
Comment. Other conditions that disproportionately affect women include, for example, 
autoimmune disorders and certain forms of mental illness like depression. Id. at 20.  
Additionally, other serious conditions such as heart disease and diabetes affect both sexes at 
comparable rates, but different treatments or practices are implicated depending on the sex of the 
patient. Id. 
21 Inst. of Medicine, supra note 18. 
22 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., supra note 19. 
23 Maggie Fox, NCBNews.com, More US Babies Die on Their First Day than in 68 Other 
Countries, Report Shows, (Apr. 30, 2013 6:47 p.m. ET), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/more-
us-babies-die-their-first-day-68-other-countries-6C9700437. 
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more day-old infants than “all other industrialized countries combined.”24  Partially to blame for 
this unlikely phenomenon is the high rate—half—of pregnancies that are not planned.  
Accidental mothers are less likely to get good prenatal care and take good care of themselves.25  
Additionally, the rate of maternal mortality (that is, women dying from pregnancy or pregnancy-
related conditions) has been steadily on the rise for twenty-five years.26  In 2008, the United 
States was ranked fiftieth in the world for maternal mortality.27  In 2010, this country’s estimated 
maternal mortality rate (maternal deaths per 100,000 live births) was comparable to the rates in 
Bahrain and Iran, and was well above the rates in Kuwait, Bosnia, and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia.28  
From a more economic perspective, mothers who are able to plan their families for when 
they are financially stable produce much healthier children in the long run.29  Additionally, good 
family planning leads to better economic prospects for both the mothers and their children.30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Save the Children, Surviving the First Day: State of the World’s Mothers 2013 at 8, (May 
2013), http:// www.savethechildrenweb.org/SOWM-
2013/files/assets/common/downloads/State%20of% 20the%20WorldOWM-2013.pdf.  
25 Fox, supra note 23; Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Unintended Pregnancy 
Prevention, (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/unintendedpregnancy. 
26 Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System, (July 18, 
2013), http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/MaternalInfantHealth/PMSS.html#5.  
27 Face the Facts USA, Maternal Mortality a Big Issue for Women’s Health in US, (July 14, 
2013), http://www.facethefactsusa.org/ facts/more-us-mothers-dying-despite-expensive-care.  
28 United Nations Population Fund, Trends in Maternal Mortality: 1990 to 2010 at 32–36 (2012), 
http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2012/Trends_in_ 
maternal_mortality_A4-1.pdf.  
29 See Martha J. Bailey, Fifty Years of U.S. Family Planning: Lessons and Implications 3–4, 
(Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/Spring%202013/2013a_bailey.pdf 
(summarizing the body of research that links childbearing in poor households with diminished 
long-term health and economic prospects). 
30 Id. 
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Employers also stand to reap economic benefits.  Evidence, although inconclusive, suggests that 
while premiums may have to be adjusted to accommodate contraception coverage, paying for 
contraception is still cheaper than paying for a pregnancy carried to term.31  
Despite the potential benefits to be reaped, there are still a number of secular, for-profit 
companies whose religious owners have filed lawsuits seeking to stop the enforcement of the 
ACA’s requirement to cover contraception.  In general, they object on the grounds that 
contraceptives, or at least certain forms of them, “[violate] the sanctity of human life” and are 
therefore “‘intrinsically evil.’”32  Each business or business owner has so far brought at least two 
challenges: one under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, and one under a statute 
passed by Congress in 1993 called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).33 
II. THE RELIGION ANGLE 
To understand the religious challenges to the ACA, it is helpful to undertake a basic 
survey of the history of free-exercise law in America.  Most of the parties with complaints 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See Cynthia Dailard, The Cost of Contraception Coverage, 6 GUTTMACHER RPT. ON PUB. POL. 
12 (Mar. 2003); FactCheck.org, Cloudy Contraception Costs, (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://www.factcheck.org/2012/02/ cloudy-contraception-costs (Two Guttmacher Institute 
studies showed that the per-person cost of contraceptive coverage was much lower than the per-
person cost of pregnancy. However, this article points out that although a number of studies have 
been conducted comparing the costs of increased contraception coverage and pregnancy 
coverage, no study has been able to definitively prove the issue one way or the other. For 
example, studies from Pennsylvania and Connecticut produced ambiguous or inconclusive 
results, a Hawaii study suggested that contraceptive coverage would result in savings, and a 
Texas study suggested that coverage would result in losses. Compounding the problem is the fact 
that many of the studies cited by both proponents and opponents of expanded contraception 
coverage were conducted almost fifteen to twenty years ago—in that time, the health care market 
has changed so much that the publishers of the Texas study warned “in the strongest possible 
language” against the use of such dated material.) 
32 John K. DiMugno, The Affordable Care Act’s Contraception Coverage Mandate, 25 NO. 1 
CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP. 1 (Feb. 2013).  
33 Id. 
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against the health care law are not actually seeking relief on constitutional grounds, although 
they are bringing constitutional challenges.34  Because the Free Exercise Clause is a part of the 
First Amendment, one might assume that it is entitled to the fiercest protection possible from the 
courts.  While that was true at one point, it is no longer;35 therefore, most complaints also include 
claims under the RFRA statute.  Although this statute imposes a much more rigorous standard 
(as will be discussed below), a statute is not as heavy a weight as the United States 
Constitution.36 
A. A PRIMER ON FREE-EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE 
Modern American free-exercise jurisprudence can be divided roughly into two eras: pre-
1990 and post-1990.  In 1990, a Supreme Court decision dramatically relaxed the standard for 
evaluating claims of infringement on religious freedom.37  But before that case, the Supreme 
Court used a much stricter standard first articulated in Sherbert v. Verner, a 1963 challenge to a 
South Carolina unemployment law.38  
Sherbert was a landmark case that expanded a well-established principle that called for 
state infringement of religious freedom to be both justified by a compelling interest and narrowly 
tailored to suit the state’s goal.39  The Sherbert decision broadened this strict scrutiny 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See infra Part II.B.  
35 See infra Part II.A. 
36 See infra Part II.A. 
37 Emp’t. Div. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
38 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
39 Id. at 406; Destyn D. Stallings, Comment, A Tough Pill to Swallow: Whether the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act Obligates Catholic Organizations to Cover Their 
Employees’ Prescription Contraceptives, 48 TULSA L. REV. 117, 126–128 (2012). 
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requirement to apply to burdens that were only incidental or indirect.40  In this case, a South 
Carolina Seventh-Day Adventist was fired from her job because she would not work on 
Saturdays, a holy day for her faith.41  She applied for work with several other employers, but 
none of them offered work that did not include Saturdays.42  She then applied for unemployment, 
but the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act required applicants to accept suitable 
work, if offered, unless the applicant had “good cause.”43  The state’s Employment Security 
Commission found that a religious restriction prohibiting work on Saturdays was not good cause, 
and her application was denied.44  Applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court found that the 
plaintiff’s exercise of religion was unmistakably burdened: she was forced to choose between 
following her faith and forfeiting benefits on one hand, and abandoning part of her faith and 
receiving benefits on the other.45  Further, the Court found that requiring a conscientious objector 
to work on holy days was not narrowly tailored to serve the government interest of preventing 
unemployment fraud, which interest was unlikely to be compelling in the first place.  The State 
was not allowed to apply the law “so as to constrain a worker to abandon his [or her] religious 
convictions.”46   
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,47 the Court further refined the position articulated in Sherbert.  In 
violation of Wisconsin’s compulsory-school-attendance law, which required children to attend 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. 
41 Id. at 399. 
42 Id. at 399–400. 
43 Id. at 401. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 404.  
46 Id. at 410. 
47 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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private or public school until the age of sixteen, a pair of Amish parents refused to send their 
high-school-aged children to school.48  While the parents did not object to schooling their 
children outside the home up through the eighth grade, they believed that exposure to a high 
school environment would imperil their children’s salvation.49  The Supreme Court found that 
requiring the Amish to send their children to school until they reached the age of sixteen would 
indeed substantially burden the free exercise of their religion, as it threatened to “[undermine] 
the Amish community and religious practice as they exist today; [the Amish] must either 
abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate to some other and 
more tolerant region.”50  The Court acknowledged that Wisconsin had a substantial interest in 
compulsory school attendance by the general population of children;51 however, the State’s 
interest was not sufficient to justify a restraint on the rights of the Amish to raise their children in 
the Amish religious tradition.52  Echoing Sherbert, the Court warned that although “religiously 
grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad police power of the State . . . there are areas 
of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the 
power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability.”53 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Id. at 208–209. 
49 Id. at 210–212. 
50 Id. at 218. 
51 Id. at 228–229.  
52 See id. at 234–235 (holding that Wisconsin could not compel the Yoders to send their children 
to school until the age of sixteen).  
53 Id. at 220. After Yoder, the Court saw several more. See, e.g. Hobbie v. Unempl. App. Comm. 
of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 138, 146 (1987) (holding that a Seventh-Day Adventist could not be 
denied unemployment after she was discharged for refusing to work on the Saturday Sabbath); 
Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind., 450 U.S. 707, 710, 719 (1981) (holding that a Jehovah’s Witness 
could not be denied unemployment benefits when he quit his manufacturing job for religious 
reasons); but see, e.g. U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254–56 (1982) (holding that an Amish 
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These cases meant that any law, including those neutral towards religion and applicable 
to the general public, which placed even an incidental or indirect burden on a plaintiff’s religious 
exercise, would be subject to strict scrutiny.54  The Court’s position was that “(o)nly the gravest 
abuses, endangering paramount interest,” could sufficiently justify restraints on the “highly 
sensitive constitutional area” of religious freedom.55 
Then, after thirty years of moving in one direction, the Supreme Court performed an 
about-face. In 1990, it “rewrote First Amendment jurisprudence,” rejecting Sherbert and its line 
of cases, and the standard of strict scrutiny along with them.56  Instead, in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, the Court “declared that a neutral law of 
general applicability represent[ed] no free exercise violation.”57 
In Smith, two Native American employees of a drug rehabilitation center were fired after 
they consumed the hallucinogen peyote, which they used for sacramental purposes during a 
ceremony at a Native American Church.58  Their unemployment benefits were denied because 
Oregon’s Department of Human Resources found that they had been fired for “misconduct:” the 
possession of peyote, a Schedule One controlled substance, was a Class B felony under Oregon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
employer had to pay social security taxes for his employees, even though he had a religious 
objection to the social safety net). 
54 Stallings, supra note 39, at 127–28. To clarify, “neutrality and general applicability are 
interrelated, and . . . failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not 
been satisfied.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 
(1993).  
55 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).  
56 Robyn Cheryl Miller, What Laws are Neutral and of General Applicability Within Meaning of 
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 
1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876, 167 A.L.R. Fed. 663, abstract (2001).  
57 494 U.S. 872; Miller, supra note 56, at § 2[a].  
58 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
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law.59  The Court refused to apply the Sherbert balancing test to an “across-the-board criminal 
prohibition on a particular form of conduct” like Oregon’s drug law, and declared that the test 
was inapplicable to such religion-neutral and otherwise constitutionally permissible laws; to rule 
otherwise would allow any person to disobey nearly any law “[not in] coincidence with his 
religious beliefs” and “to become a law unto himself.”60  The Court’s ruling in Smith meant that 
a person’s religious beliefs do not exempt him or her from having to follow an “otherwise valid 
law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”61 
A few years later, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider both the Smith and 
Sherbert tests for the same controversy.62  First, the Court asked whether the offending law was 
“neutral and generally applicable as defined in Smith”— if so, then it would only have to 
withstand rational basis scrutiny; if not, then the government would have to show that the law 
was “narrowly tailored to further a compelling [state] interest, as defined in Sherbert.”63  
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,64 the city of Hialeah passed 
ordinances that placed heavy restrictions on animal killing, in direct response to the 
establishment of a Santeria church in the area.65  The Santeria religion, somewhat famously, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Id. at 875. 
60 Id. at 885–886, 890. 
61 Id. at 878–79. 
 
62 Craig Mandell, Tough Pill to Swallow: Whether Catholic Institutions Are Obligated under 
Title VII to Cover Their Employees’ Prescription Contraceptives, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, 
GENDER & CLASS 199, 209 (2008). 
63 Id. 
64 508 U.S. 520, 526–527 (1993). 
65 Id. 
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includes animal sacrifice in its rituals.66  Among the practices banned by the ordinances were 
killing animals in public or private ceremonies and keeping such animals for food purposes; 
however, slaughterhouses large and small were exempted from the ordinances.67  The Court 
found that the ordinance’s broad exemptions for slaughterhouses and specific sacrifice-related 
language equated to a targeting of the Santeria church and its religious practice; thus, the 
ordinances were neither religion-neutral nor generally applicable.68  In other words, the 
government could not rest on the newer, less-rigorous rational basis standard, laid out in Smith, 
to justify a burden on religious exercise.  Since Hialeah’s ordinance targeted a religious practice, 
and on a practical level applied only to the church, the city’s government had to carry the heavy 
burden of passing the Sherbert test: once it was determined that the law burdened religious 
exercise, it had to pass strict scrutiny.69  The Court found that Hialeah’s ordinances failed strict 
scrutiny and were declared unconstitutional.70  While the state may have had a compelling 
interest in protecting animal welfare, the law was not at all narrowly tailored.  It was therefore an 
example of a law that was neither neutral nor generally applicable, and on top of that did not pass 
strict scrutiny.  
The new standard for free-exercise challenges did not last long.  Congress was unhappy 
with the ruling in Smith, finding that it had “virtually eliminated the requirement that the 
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion.”71  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Id. at 525. 
67 Id. at 528. 
68 Id. at 542. 
69 Id. at 547. 
70 Id. 
71 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (2012).  
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1993, with the explicit purpose of “[restoring] the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert 
v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder,”72 it passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 
which states:  
(a) In general 
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section. 
 
(b) Exception 
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-- 
 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.73 
 
The passage of RFRA meant that while the Smith decision still applied to constitutional 
challenges, parties alleging burdens on their religious exercise were much more likely to succeed 
than before.  The key that made Smith such a drastic change was that it saved religion-neutral 
laws from being subjected to strict scrutiny.  This lower standard is still in place for challenges 
brought only under the First Amendment.  In practice, however, plaintiffs can avail themselves 
of the much higher statutory standard established by RFRA.  The result is that any law burdening 
religion, neutral or not, may still be required to pass strict scrutiny.  
The first major application of RFRA occurred four years later in a small Texas town.  A 
Catholic Archbishop in Boerne applied for a building permit, planning to enlarge his church, 
which was situated within the town’s historic district.  The city’s Historic Landmark 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Id. at § 2000bb(b)(1) (citations omitted). 
73 Id. at § 2000bb-1. 
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Commission denied the permit request.74  The Archbishop challenged the decision under the 
newly passed RFRA, claiming that the city’s denial of the permit was an unlawful restraint on 
his religious exercise.75  The Supreme Court did not address whether the Archbishop had a 
cognizable claim under RFRA; instead, it found that the enforcement of RFRA at the state level 
was beyond Congress’s constitutional authority.76  As written, the Court pointed out, RFRA 
permitted “any law [to be] subject to challenge at any time by any individual who [alleged] a 
substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion.”77  The result of the Boerne ruling was 
that RFRA remained in force, but only against laws at the federal level.  
In a stroke of symmetry, RFRA saw its next landmark application in another case 
involving the sacramental use of a controlled substance.  A church with roots in the Amazon 
Rainforest used a hallucinogenic tea (called hoasca) brewed from the leaves of a native 
Amazonian plant as part of its communion ritual.78  Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 
which banned use of the hallucinogen entirely, the government moved to block the church from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511–12 (1997). 
75 Id. at 512.  
76 Id. at 537. 
77 Id. at 533.  Additionally, although the Court did not address it in the majority opinion, Justice 
Stevens in his concurrence pointed out a problematic feature of RFRA:  
If the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne happened to be a museum or an art 
gallery owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible for an exemption from the 
city ordinances that forbid an enlargement of the structure. Because the landmark 
is owned by the Catholic Church, it is claimed that RFRA gives its owner a 
federal statutory entitlement to an exemption from a generally applicable, neutral 
civil law. Whether the Church would actually prevail under the statute or not, the 
statute has provided the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic 
can obtain. This governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is 
forbidden by the First Amendment. 
Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
78 Gonzales v. O Centro Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006). 
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importing the tea and prosecuted the church for its violation.79  The church challenged the 
government’s action, relying on RFRA.  Essentially conceding that a prohibition on the 
sacramental tea would substantially burden the church’s free exercise, the government argued 
that it had a compelling interest in the “uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act” 
sufficient to justify such a burden.80  Referencing both Smith and a statutory exemption in the 
CSA allowing Native Americans to use sacramental peyote, the Supreme Court found that 
allowing an exemption for the small church’s use of hoasca would not undermine the 
government’s (admittedly) strong interest in enforcing the CSA.81  The Court concluded by 
pointing out that “under RFRA[,] invocation of general interests, standing alone, is not 
enough.”82  
The state of free-exercise jurisprudence after O Centro is somewhat complicated, since 
there are two standards at work.  Federal laws may be challenged using either a First 
Amendment claim or a RFRA claim (or both, as many of the ACA litigants have done).  The 
Smith test is still applicable for First Amendment claims, but RFRA allows for a much stricter 
test.  However, because of Boerne, the challenge of state laws under the federal RFRA is not 
permitted.  A plaintiff seeking to challenge a state law for infringing on religious exercise may 
be able to rely on a state-level mini-RFRA, but only half of the states in the nation have such a 
law.83  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Id. at 426.  
80 Id. at 430, 423. 
81 Id. at 432–35. 
82 Id. at 438. 
83 Mandell, supra note 62, at n. 198 (listing the twenty-five states that have, by various means, 
required a strict scrutiny standard for analyzing burdens on religious exercise: twelve by 
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B. ONGOING CHALLENGES TO THE ACA 
The plaintiffs in the ongoing challenges to the ACA are using both of the standards 
discussed above; however, while all of them “raise free exercise issues [under the First 
Amendment], they seek recovery under [RFRA].”84  In any case, the two analyses are closely 
related because of their shared ancestry.  Since the number of cases addressing this issue has 
multiplied, it would be impractical to address every case.  Instead, what follows is a brief 
summary of some of the more important decisions that have been made.85  
One of the first injunctions to be denied was in O’Brien v. U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services.86  Plaintiffs were Frank O’Brien and his company, O’Brien Industrial Holdings 
(OIH).87  O’Brien filed a complaint alleging that the ACA violated both OIH’s and his personal 
rights under the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA, and others.  The government filed a motion to 
dismiss the entire case.88  The court first addressed O’Brien’s RFRA claim (since if the challenge 
could not survive the RFRA analysis, it would be unable to withstand the lower standard of the 
First Amendment analysis).  A prima facie case under RFRA requires a plaintiff to allege a 
“substantial burden” on his or her religious exercise, even if the burden results from a generally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
legislation, twelve by court interpretation of that state’s constitution, and one (Alabama) by 
constitutional amendment).  
84 DiMugno, supra note 32. 
85 The included cases were chosen based on several factors, including (a) the detail of the 
decision’s reasoning (some courts’ opinions are quite short); (b) the authority of the deciding 
court (circuit court decisions were chosen over district court decisions, if possible); and (c) the 
age of the decision (which was related to the number of times it had been cited in later 
decisions).  
86 894 F.Supp.2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (stayed pending appeal with no discussion. Case No. 12-
3357 (4:12-CV-00476-CEJ) (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012)).   
87 Id. at 1154.  
88 Id.  
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applicable law.  If the plaintiff establishes this, then the burden shifts to the government to show 
that the law serves a “compelling governmental interest, [and that it] is the least-restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”89  O’Brien asserted that not only his, 
but his company’s, rights to religious freedom were substantially burdened by the requirement 
that his company arrange for insurance coverage that included contraception.90 
The court did not address whether OIH was able to exercise religion, because it 
concluded that there was no substantial burden.  Substantiality is “a difficult threshold to cross,” 
and must be “more than insignificant or remote.”91  In this case, the court characterized the 
burden on O’Brien as even more remote than de minimis: 
The burden of which plaintiffs complain is that funds, which plaintiffs will 
contribute to a group health plan, might, after a series of independent decisions by 
health care providers and patients covered by OIH’s plan, subsidize someone 
else’s participation in an activity that is condemned by plaintiffs’ religion. This 
Court rejects the proposition that requiring indirect financial support of a practice, 
from which plaintiff himself abstains according to his religious principles, 
constitutes a substantial burden on plaintiff’s religious exercise.92 
 
Finding no substantial burden, the court held that O’Brien had failed to state a claim 
under RFRA; it thus never addressed whether the government’s interest was compelling or its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Id. at 1157.  The O Centro decision also strongly emphasized this burden. In that case, the 
district court granted the church’s preliminary injunction after finding that the evidence from 
both sides was evenly balanced; therefore, it said, the government had failed to carry its burden. 
O Centro, 546 U.S. at 426–427.  The government argued that evidence in equipoise was not 
enough to justify a preliminary injunction for the plaintiff, but the Court countered that once the 
church’s prima facie RFRA case had been established, the government could only succeed by 
demonstrating “that the application of the burden to the [church] would, more likely than not, be 
justified by the asserted compelling interests.” Id. at 428.  
90 O’Brien, 894 F.Supp.2d at 1154. 
91 Id. at 1158. 
92 Id. at 1159. 
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means narrowly tailored.93  The court then addressed O’Brien’s First Amendment free-exercise 
claims.  Citing the Smith decision, it stated that “a neutral law of general applicability that 
incidentally burdens religious exercise need only satisfy rational basis review, not strict 
scrutiny.”94  The court found that the ACA was neutral—it did not target religion, it targeted the 
“disparity between men’s and women’s healthcare costs”—and it was generally applicable—it 
did not selectively infringe upon religious conduct.95  The court also pointed out that the 
exemptions to the mandate did not mean a lack of general applicability; they would have to be 
exemptions that “[tended] to suggest disfavor of religion.”96  Thus, the court concluded simply 
that the ACA “[did] not offend the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.”97 
Taking a different track but reaching the same result, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
denied an injunction for a Mennonite family’s business.98  In Conestoga Wood Specialties 
Corporation v. Sebelius, the Third Circuit focused entirely on the threshold issue of whether a 
for-profit corporation could exercise religion, and came to the conclusion that it could not.99  The 
court engaged in a lengthy discussion about the history of the interpretation of the various 
clauses within the First Amendment, and decided that the Free Speech Clause (held to apply to 
corporations in the recent Citizens United decision) was fundamentally different from the Free 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Id. at 1160. 
94 Id. at 1160 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 872). 
95 Id. at 1161. 
96 Id. at 1162 (discussing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542-46 in which the law exempted virtually every 
type of animal killing except for religious sacrifice). 
97 Id.  
98 Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 381. 
99 Id.  
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Exercise Clause; it confessed that it “simply [could not] understand how a for-profit, secular 
corporation—apart from its owners—[could] exercise religion.”100 
Without the corporation’s ability to exercise religion, the plaintiffs were unable to 
assemble a prima facie case of a violation of RFRA; since the corporation was not an entity 
capable of religious expression; the only parties with freedom to be infringed upon were the 
members of the Mennonite family who owned the business.101  But as the court pointed out, it 
was not their freedom being restrained, it was the corporation’s.  The court cautioned against 
“[eliding] the distinction between [owners] and the companies they own,”102 and said that 
corporate owners must “respect the corporate form, on pain of losing the benefits of that form 
should they fail to do so.”103  Having decided this threshold issue in favor of the government, the 
court easily disposed of the plaintiffs’ RFRA claims:  
Our conclusion that a for-profit, secular corporation cannot assert a claim under 
the Free Exercise Clause necessitates the conclusion that a for-profit, secular 
corporation cannot engage in the exercise of religion. Since Conestoga cannot 
exercise religion, it cannot assert a RFRA claim. We thus need not decide whether 
such a corporation is a “person” under the RFRA.104 
 
So far, four circuit court decisions and numerous district court decisions have denied the 
plaintiffs’ injunctions.105  However, several of these district court decisions have been reversed, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Id. at 385. 
101 Id. at 388. 
102 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 
2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting)). 
103 Id. (quoting Grote, 708 F.3d at 858). 
104 Id. 
105 The four circuit courts include the Third Circuit, deciding Conestoga, 724 F.3d 377; the Sixth 
Circuit, deciding Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2013), and Autocam Corp. 
v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013); and the Tenth and D.C. Circuits—which both first 
denied injunctions in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, Case No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 
6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) and Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 733 
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and of the four appellate courts issuing decisions that denied relief, two have reversed 
themselves; this has resulted in a total nationwide tally of four circuit court decisions granting 
injunctive relief to the religious employer plaintiffs.106  
After a protracted battle, the Tenth Circuit recently issued a “fractured decision” that 
resulted in injunctive relief protecting the retail chain Hobby Lobby from enforcement of the 
mandate; the court, rather than granting the injunction itself, reversed and remanded the case 
back to the lower court (which did grant the injunction).107  The plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby 
include two retail chains, Hobby Lobby craft stores and Mardel Christian bookstores, and the 
Greens, the family that owns them.108  They objected to the use of emergency contraception and 
intrauterine devices because “‘they [believed] those drugs could prevent a human embryo … 
from implanting;’” they further opposed “participating in, providing access to, paying for, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013), respectively, then reversed themselves and the courts below to grant 
injunctions to the same plaintiffs,	  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 
(10th Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (U.S. 2013); Gilardi, 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 
2013).  The other two circuits to make decisions on the issue have been the Seventh and Eighth 
Circuits. The Eighth Circuit granted an injunction in O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, that 
consisted of one sentence: “Appellants’ motion for stay pending appeal has been considered by 
the court, and the motion is granted.”  The other injunction from that circuit acknowledged the 
lack of reasoning in that decision, but granted the injunction for the sake of consistency.  Annex 
Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, 13-1118, 2013 WL 1276025 at *3 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013). 
106 See Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 377 n. 10 (compiling a detailed list of contraception mandate 
cases that ended in an injunction being granted).  See also Becket Fund, supra  note 5 
(maintaining an interactive list of all challenges to the contraception mandate).  
107 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. June 27, 2013) (en banc); 
ACLU, Tenth Circuit Rules on Craft Store’s Challenge to Contraception Coverage Rule, (June 
27, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/reproductive-freedom/tenth-circuit-rules-craft-stores 
-challenge-contraception-coverage-rule. 
108 Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1122. 
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training others to engage in, or otherwise supporting’ the devices and drugs that yield these 
effects.”109 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision started from the position that corporations such as Hobby 
Lobby are persons capable of exercising religion.110  It drew parallels between for-profit 
businesses and the churches in Lukumi and O Centro, reasoning that “the Supreme Court [had] 
affirmed the RFRA rights of corporate claimants, notwithstanding the claimants’ decision to use 
the corporate form.”111  It also reasoned that if the Constitution guarantees for-profit companies 
the right to free political speech, then it also guarantees their right to religious expression.112  
Further, the court listed a number of attributes possessed by the companies—they were “closely 
held family businesses with an explicit Christian mission as defined in their governing 
principles,” among others—which collectively differentiated them from large, publicly held 
corporations that would not be “eligible for RFRA’s protections.”113 
Once the court determined that the plaintiff corporations were entities capable of 
religious exercise, it quickly concluded that the corporations’ free exercise was substantially 
burdened.114  The court decided the compelling interest prong just as quickly.  Drawing on O 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Id. at 1140. 
110 Id. at 1128. 
111 Id. at 1129. 
112 Id. at 1134-35. 
113 Id. at 1137. 
114 Id. at 1151.  As Judge Hartz pointed out in his concurrence, the court may have misinterpreted 
the plaintiff’s burden argument. The majority opinion focused on the heavy fines that a non-
complying company would have to face. Id. (Hartz, J., concurring). Other parties have made this 
argument, e.g. Beckwith Elec. Co., Inc. v. Sebelius, 8:13-CV-0648-T-17MAP, 2013 WL 
3297498, at *15 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2013), but it mischaracterizes exactly what the burden is. 
The burden is related not to the dollar amount of fines, but to the provision of coverage itself: 
“[t]he law . . . compels the corporations to act contrary to their religious beliefs” by providing 
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Centro, the court held that the exemptions already in place for religious institutions and small 
employers showed that the government’s interest, while strong, was not strong enough to meet 
the high standard of “compelling.”115  Finally, because of the government’s failure to “articulate 
why accommodating such a limited request fundamentally [frustrated] its goals,” the court spent 
a bare three sentences disposing of the “least restrictive means” prong.116 
In another decision, the Seventh Circuit consolidated two cases involving religious 
family-owned businesses and granted injunctions staving off the enforcement of the 
contraception mandate.117  The Kortes owned K & L Contractors and provided for the 
company’s nonunion employees with a group health insurance plan.118  The Grotes owned Grote 
Industries, and provided a self-insured plan for their roughly twelve hundred employees.119  The 
court did not find that either party’s use of the corporate form was dispositive, since in both cases 
the corporations’ owners were also plaintiffs; in order to comply with the mandate, each owner 
would have to violate his religious beliefs.120  The court also rejected the government’s 
argument, which had been successful in several district courts,121 that the connection between the 
objectionable action and the plaintiffs was too attenuated: “the religious-liberty violation at issue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
coverage. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1151.  There is “no need to examine how damaging the 
sanctions for noncompliance would be” in order to analyze the substantiality of the burden. Id. 
115 Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1128. 
116 Id. at 1144. 
117 Grote, 708 F.3d at 852. 
118 Id. at 854.  
119 Id. at 852. 
120 Id.; Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2013). 
121 E.g., Grote v. Sebelius, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Ind. 2012); O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149; 
Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278. 
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here inheres in the coerced coverage of contraception, abortifacients,122 sterilization, and related 
services, not—or perhaps more precisely, not only—in the later purchase or use of contraception 
or related services.”123  The Seventh Circuit did not address whether the government was likely 
to satisfy strict scrutiny, as the government made no effort to do so in either case; the court 
granted injunctions for both plaintiffs.124 
C.  ANALYSIS: CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS125 
Complaints about laws violating a plaintiff’s right to free exercise are analyzed using the 
test laid out in Smith: if a law is (1) religion-neutral and (2) generally applicable, then it only 
violates the Free Exercise Clause if it fails to satisfy rational basis scrutiny.126  Since the ACA 
facially has nothing to do with religion, the only way to argue that it is not religion-neutral is to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 One of the most commonly objected-to provisions of the ACA is the requirement that 
emergency contraception be covered, because religious employers consider it an “abortifacient.” 
This is frustrating for supporters of the mandate because it demonstrates a lack of understanding 
of the concepts at work. Emergency contraception does not cause abortions.  Research shows 
that it does not affect the “developing embryo or pre-embryo” of an already-pregnant woman, 
and the most effective types of emergency contraception do not even affect implantation. 
Emergency contraception prevents fertilization from happening in the first place by inhibiting 
ovulation, like any other hormonal birth control. Fertilization commonly takes as long as a week 
after the act of intercourse, which is why it is possible to take emergency contraception several 
days after an incident of unprotected sex.  For a quick but thorough explanation of these details, 
see Planned Parenthood’s page explaining the differences between medication abortion and 
emergency contraception.  Planned Parenthood, The Difference Between Emergency 
Contraception And Medication Abortion, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/resources/research-
papers/difference-between-emergency-contraception-medication-abortion-6138.html (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2009). 
123 Korte, 735 F.3d at 685. 
124 Grote, 708 F.3d at 855. 
125 A detailed analysis of whether the corporate plaintiffs in these cases have the ability to 
exercise religious freedom would double the length of this Comment. The Author acknowledges 
that this is a very complicated issue, but it is largely outside the scope of this Comment. The 
following Parts will proceed under the assumption that the corporate plaintiffs cannot practice 
religion, unless it is otherwise noted in the text.  
126 DiMugno, supra note 32. 
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argue that the requirement to provide contraception coverage was somehow written to target 
religion.127  The First Amendment is effectively a “dead letter in cases challenging mandatory 
benefit laws,” and no First Amendment challenge to a contraceptive coverage mandate has ever 
failed the Smith test.128  As the courts have pointed out, the ACA allows for exemptions from the 
contraception mandate; if an employer fulfills all of the following requirements:  
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization. 
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of 
the organization. 
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the 
organization. 
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization, 
 
then it is relieved of having to cover contraceptives for its employees.129  These exemptions to 
the mandate clearly show that the law not only fails to target religious activity, but in fact 
actively tries to accommodate religious activity.  The ACA cannot be equated with the city 
ordinance in Lukumi, where virtually every type of animal slaughter was exempt from the 
ordinance, leaving only ritual or sacrificial killings to be forbidden.130  The ACA has a small, 
concise exemption for religious organizations.  
 Furthermore, despite its exemptions, it is generally applicable. If the contraception 
mandate were not generally applicable, there would be little point to it, given that its purpose is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 See Stallings, supra note 39, at 130 (laying out the test for determining neutrality in this 
context: a law is neutral if it (1) does not facially target a religious practice; (2) does not have a 
discriminatory purpose; and (3) does not have a discriminatory effect). 
128 DiMugno, supra note 32. 
129 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(1)(vi)(B)(1)–(4) (2013). 
130 Stallings, supra note 39, at 131 (“[T]he law . . . allowed the killing of animals by other 
religions, such as kosher slaughtering of animals, as well as those that allowed the killing of 
animals for nonreligious purposes, such as hunting. Because the ordinances were designed to 
proscribe animal killings for religious sacrifice, but to exclude virtually all secular killings, the 
Court noted that the ordinances constituted a ‘religious gerrymander.’”). 
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widespread access to affordable healthcare.  It applies to all organizations that would otherwise 
be subject to the health care mandate, without regard to religious affiliation.  As the court pointed 
out in O’Brien, the exemptions themselves do not equate to a lack of general applicability; they 
would have to be exemptions that “[tend] to suggest disfavor of religion,” when in fact these 
exemptions do the opposite.131  
D. ANALYSIS: CLAIMS UNDER RFRA 
Challenges under RFRA stand on much stronger ground, because while the First 
Amendment challenges must only pass rational-basis muster, RFRA challenges must satisfy 
strict scrutiny.  To build a prima facie RFRA case, a plaintiff must show that it faces a substantial 
burden on its sincere religious exercise.132  Since it is difficult for the courts to pass judgment on 
what is and is not sincere religious belief, in practical terms, building a case means showing a 
substantial burden.133  
Because RFRA was passed with the explicit intention of restoring the tests laid out in 
Sherbert and Yoder,134 it is helpful to examine cases from that line for guidance as to what is and 
is not a substantial burden.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. 
132 O Centro, 546 U.S. at 428. 
133 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (reaffirming that “‘[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the 
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of the particular litigants’ 
interpretations of those creeds,’” and warning that “courts must not presume to determine the 
place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.” (quoting 
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989))). In an opinion concurring in the judgment, 
Justice O’Connor reminded the Court that courts were permitted to “make factual findings as to 
whether a claimant holds a sincerely held religious belief that conflicts with, and thus is 
burdened by, [a] challenged law.” Id. at 907.  
134 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2013). 
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 In Sherbert itself, the burden faced by the plaintiff was the violation of her religious 
beliefs by having to work on her Sabbath day.135  In Yoder, the Amish parents were faced with 
exposing their children to an immersive and harmful environment by forcing their children to 
attend high school in violation of their beliefs.136  In O Centro, churchgoers were faced with not 
only the loss of their holy communion, but also with criminal prosecution.137  In each of these 
cases, the Court rightly found that the plaintiffs’ religious exercise was substantially burdened.  
 In the ACA cases, however, the burden faced by the employers is significantly lower.  
Each of the three above plaintiffs were faced with having to directly violate their personal 
religious tenets.138  The O’Brien court effectively explained the contrast between those burdens 
and the ones at hand:  
The burden of which plaintiffs complain is that funds, which plaintiffs will 
contribute to a group health plan, might, after a series of independent decisions by 
health care providers and patients covered by [a health] plan, subsidize someone 
else's participation in an activity that is condemned by plaintiffs’ religion.139  
 
In other words, without even reaching the issue of whether the plaintiff corporations can 
exercise religion, the burden on their religious exercise is minimal because of the extreme 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 374 U.S. at 404. 
136 406 U.S. at 205. 
137 546 U.S. at 418. 
138 Also worth mentioning is the fact that in these cases, there are third parties with rights at 
stake: the female employees of the plaintiffs.  None of the cases in the Sherbert line seriously 
involved the rights or interests of anyone but the plaintiffs and the government.  See supra Part 
II.A.  To be sure, although the corporate plaintiffs’ employees do not have a guaranteed right to 
contraception, they do have the right to bodily autonomy and, as Part III, infra, will discuss in 
greater detail, the right to be free from sex-based discrimination.  
139 O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1159 (E.D. Mo. 
2012) (stayed pending appeal with no discussion. Case No. 12-3357 (4:12-CV-00476-CEJ) (8th 
Cir. Nov. 28, 2012)).	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attenuation.  If one grants the premise that a corporation cannot exercise religion, the burden 
becomes more attenuated still.  
 On the other hand, some courts have framed the burden a different way.  The courts 
granting injunctions have found that the religiously objectionable conduct is not the use of 
contraception, but the facilitation of access to contraception.140  In these cases, the fact that the 
employers are not, themselves, forced to use or promote contraception has not factored into the 
analysis—it is enough that the employers must participate in the possibility that their employees 
will use contraception.  Because religious belief itself is so nebulous, “[c]laims that a law 
substantially burdens someone’s exercise of religion will often be difficult to contest.”141 
 If this view is ultimately favored, then the government will have to prove that it has a 
compelling interest in uniform enforcement of the contraception mandate.  Few cases to date 
have addressed in depth whether the government’s interest would be considered compelling.142  
One instructive example may be found in United States v. Lee.143  In that case, an Amish 
employer refused to pay payroll taxes, because the subsidization and receipt of public welfare 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 E.g. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 2013); Tyndale House Pubs., Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 121–22 (D.D.C. 2012).   
141 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).	  
142 See, e.g., Beckwith, 2013 WL 32977498 at *17 (going into some detail in analyzing the 
compelling interest prong and finding that the number of exemptions to the government’s health 
plan severely undermined the government’s argument that its interest was compelling); Tyndale 
House Pubs., 904 F. Supp. 2d at 126–27 (finding no proof that exclusion of emergency 
contraception—as opposed to conventional contraception—would hinder the government’s 
interest, and also finding that the number of exemptions from the ACA undermined the 
government’s position).  Most decisions denying injunctive relief have done so based on the 
plaintiffs’ failure to establish their prima facie cases under RFRA, so the courts do not analyze 
whether the government would be able to prove a compelling interest.  E.g., Briscoe v. Sebelius, 
927 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1117–18 (D. Colo. 2013); Annex Med. v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 1276025 at 
*5 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013).	  
143 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
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funds violated his religious beliefs.144  The Court decided that the social security system is 
dependent on mandatory, near-universal participation; the system would quickly start to fray if 
religious objectors were allowed to exempt themselves.145  In this case, the government’s interest 
was so compelling that it outweighed the individual’s interest in complete religious freedom.  
The court noted that “[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a 
matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith 
are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that 
activity.”146 
That said, the cleanest victory for supporters of the mandate lies in showing that the 
religious employers do not face a substantial burden.  As the Boerne court warned, such claims 
are difficult to disprove, and the government faces a heavy burden in proving that it has a 
compelling interest at stake.147  As each new court decides to grant a preliminary injunction, 
which cannot be done unless the court finds a likelihood of success on the merits, it seems less 
and less likely that the ultimate decision by the Supreme Court will be in favor of the 
government. 
III. POSSIBLE RECOURSE: TITLE VII 
What possible recourse, then, for a woman employed by one of these religious 
employers?  If the controversy favors the religious employers, it will be because they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Id. at 257.  The Amish believe that failure to provide for one’s own elders is sinful; therefore, 
the national social security system is sinful because it supplants the Amish as the bearer of that 
responsibility. Id. 
145 Id. at 258–259. 
146 Id. at 261.  The Court did not address in detail whether Wisconsin’s law was narrowly 
tailored to serve the State’s interest. Id. 
147 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). 
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successfully used RFRA to win exemptions.  Knowing what they had to prove to win their 
challenges allows the employers’ interest in religious freedom to be placed in a hierarchy: while 
the government’s interest in promoting the health of female employees by ensuring access to 
reproductive services was indeed strong, the individual employers’ interest in religious freedom 
was deemed stronger.  If female employees, or male employees with female dependents, find 
themselves deprived of access to contraception because of an employer’s religious beliefs, the 
key to restoring access will have to be identifying an interest higher in the hierarchy.  Because of 
the Smith decision, and the low likelihood of any plaintiff winning on its Free Exercise Clause 
challenge, the employers’ constitutional interests are unlikely to enter into the ensuing 
discussion; therefore, it would be the employers’ statutory interests bestowed by RFRA that the 
employees would have to top in the hierarchy. One possible route to recourse could be Title VII.   
Title VII is shorthand for the sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act that prohibit 
discrimination in the workplace.  Its passage is surrounded by a certain amount of lore: 
“conventional wisdom” says that, while Congress had planned all along to protect the classes of 
race, color, religion, and national origin, it only decided at the last minute to include sex as one 
of the protected categories.148  In fact, one myth claims that the sex discrimination provision was 
added as a political ploy to stop the Civil Rights Act altogether—its sponsors thought that a 
prohibition against workplace sex discrimination would be thought of as so ridiculous that such a 
provision would stop the entire bill in its tracks.149  As a result of its hurried addition to the law, 
the sex discrimination provisions have presented some challenges in interpretation—there is very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of 
Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137, 137 
(1997). 
149 Id.  
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little Congressional discussion to help guide the courts in the law’s application.150  
Unfortunately, one of the areas that suffers somewhat from these murky waters is the provision 
of insurance that covers contraception.  
A. TITLE VII AND CONTRACEPTION 
One of the first major cases to explore the boundaries of the prohibition of sex 
discrimination was General Electric Company v. Gilbert.151  General Electric (GE) offered its 
employees a disability plan that covered non-occupational illnesses and injuries.152  When two 
female employees became pregnant and applied for benefits to cover their pregnancy-related 
absences from work, however, their claims were “routinely denied” because GE’s plan did not 
cover pregnancy-related disabilities. 153  
At the trial level, the court found that the exclusion of pregnancy from the otherwise-
comprehensive plan constituted sex-based discrimination, noting that a normal, uncomplicated 
pregnancy “was disabling for a period of six to eight weeks.” 154  The result of GE’s policy was 
that while men and women paid roughly the same amount155 for insurance, the male employees 
enjoyed full coverage while the female employees did not.156   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 See id. at 142–43 (discussing numerous cases in which the sex discrimination provision’s lack 
of legislative history led to restrictions on protections for women).  
151 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
152 Id. at 127. 
153 Id. at 128–29. 
154 Id. at 130, 132. 
155 In fact, the cost of insurance, without the pregnancy coverage, to GE’s female employees was 
sometimes “substantially more” than the cost to its male employees.  And in any case, the district 
court specifically rejected the “cost differential” defense, saying that even if the pregnancy-
inclusive cost was higher than the pregnancy-exclusive cost, Title VII required its coverage.  Id. 
156 Id. at 130–32. 
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The Supreme Court thoroughly disagreed.  It found that there was “no risk from which 
men [were] protected and women [were] not,”157 and found evidence of neither an attempt 
“‘invidiously to discriminate on the basis of . . . impermissible classification’” nor even a 
“gender-based discriminatory effect.”158  As far as the Court was concerned, GE offered all of its 
employees comprehensive coverage regardless of gender; thus, there was no discrimination.159  
The dissent pointed out that for the Court to reach this conclusion, it had to classify the 
non-covered individuals as pregnant women, and the covered individuals as non-pregnant 
persons—even though women exclusively made up one side, men and women were on the other 
side.  Justices Brennan and Stevens took issue with this logic.160  
Justice Brennan, stating that “the Court’s assumption that General Electric engaged in a 
gender-neutral risk-assignment process [was] purely fanciful,”161 divided the classes differently:  
First, the plan covers all disabilities that mutually afflict both sexes.  Second, the 
plan insures against all disabilities that are male-specific or have a predominant 
impact on males.  Finally, all female-specific and female-impacted disabilities are 
covered, except for the most prevalent, pregnancy.162 
 
In other words, Justice Brennan argued that the majority’s conceptual framework was 
wrong.  The opposing classes were not pregnant women and non-pregnant people, but rather 
men, who enjoyed full comprehensive coverage, and women, who did not. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974). 
158 Id. at 137–38 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
159 Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV. 363, 
375–76 (1998). 
160 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 147–48, 155 (Brennan & Stevens, J.J., dissenting). 
161 Id. at 148. 
162 Id. at 155 (citation omitted). 
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Congress was displeased by the Supreme Court’s decision.  The Court had ignored the 
guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), decisions 
by eighteen federal district courts, and the decisions of all federal courts of appeal to have 
touched the issue.163  Two years after Gilbert, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act (PDA), which amended the language in Title VII to clarify the meaning of “on the basis of 
sex”: 
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited to, 
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; 
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall 
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of 
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but 
similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of 
this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.  This subsection shall not require 
an employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except where the 
life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except 
where medical complications have arisen from an abortion: Provided, That 
nothing herein shall preclude an employer from providing abortion benefits or 
otherwise affect bargaining agreements in regard to abortion.164 
 
Essentially, Congress wrote the Gilbert dissent into law.  It found that the “dissenting justices 
had correctly interpreted the act.”165  
It did not take long for the PDA’s scope to be tested.  In 1983, the male employees of 
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company took their employer to court.166  Their 
complaint was not for themselves, but for their wives.  While the company had promptly 
complied with the PDA’s edict to add coverage of the pregnancy-related issues of its female 
employees, no such adjustment had been made for female dependents of male employees.  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 H.R. Rep. 95-948 at 4750 (May 11, 1993). 
164 Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). 
165 H.R. Rep. 95-948 at 4750. 
166 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983). 
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resulted in full coverage for employees’ husbands, but deficient coverage for employees’ 
wives—in short, discrimination against male employees.167  
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, rejected both the narrow 
holding and the reasoning of the Gilbert decision.168  It pointed out that Newport’s policy was 
the “mirror image” of GE’s plan, which Congress had unequivocally declared to be in violation 
of Title VII; that the dependents, and not the employees directly, were the ones being 
discriminated against did not change the clear fact that “discrimination based on a woman’s 
pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex.”169 
The PDA and Newport established that employers may not discriminate on the basis of 
pregnancy or pregnancy-related conditions.  However, that alone does not mean that employees’ 
access to contraceptive care is guaranteed.  The legal connection between “pregnancy-related” 
and “contraceptive” is not entirely iron-clad.  In 2000, the EEOC released a commission decision 
recommending that contraception should be covered.170  The decision pointed out that the “PDA 
prohibits ‘discrimination on the basis of a woman’s ability to become pregnant’”—not on the 
basis of a woman’s actual pregnancy—which logically leads to the conclusion that 
contraception, as a means to prevent or plan pregnancy, should be considered “pregnancy-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Id. at 672–73. 
168 Id. at 676. 
169 Id. at 684–85. 
170 Comm’n Decision on Coverage of Contraception, 2000 WL 33407187 (E.E.O.C. Guidance 
Dec. 14, 2000). 
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related” and therefore covered by the PDA.171  Agency policy positions, however, are not always 
entitled to deference in court.172 
The first case to deal with whether Title VII covered contraception was Erickson v. 
Bartell, decided in 2001.173  In that case, the employer’s comprehensive health plan excluded 
coverage of all contraceptive drugs and devices.  The company’s female employees sued under 
the PDA.174  The court invoked the reasoning of the Gilbert dissent, and made a direct 
comparison between that case and the instant one: excluding prescription contraception coverage 
from an otherwise comprehensive plan discriminates against women, since it leaves women with 
less coverage than men.175  The court also noted the EEOC’s 2000 contraception decision, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Id. at *2 (emphasis added). 
172 The question of how much deference to afford an agency’s position is a very complicated 
one, and one that is largely outside the scope of this Comment, except to say the following. On 
one hand, the Court has said that “it is axiomatic that the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII, for 
which it has primary enforcement responsibility . . . need only be reasonable to be entitled to 
deference.”  EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988).  On the other 
hand, not every decision by the EEOC is entitled to such deference.  In Re Union Pacific 
Railroad Employment Practices Litigation, 479 F.3d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 2007) (“An agency’s 
interpretation that is found in an opinion letter, policy statement, agency manual or enforcement 
guideline ‘lack[s] the force of law’ and is not entitled to deference under Chevron” (citing 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984))); see 
also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45 (holding that if the intent of Congress is unclear from a 
reading of the statute, then the reasonable opinion of the agency whose purpose is to enforce that 
statute is entitled to great deference); Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Construction and Application of 
“Chevron Deference” to Administrative Action by the United States Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R. 
Fed. 2d 25, §§ 48–49 (2005) (comparing Supreme Court cases that did and did not afford EEOC 
decisions Chevron deference).  
173 Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).  There have been 
more cases since then, but not many. See Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979 
(2003) (denying employer’s motion to dismiss on claims similar to Erickson).  
174 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268. 
175 Id. at 1274–75. 
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further buttressed the court’s conclusion that the company had violated Title VII, and was 
required to cover prescription contraceptives.176  
Not every court has agreed with this reasoning. In fact, the only case to reach the 
appellate level went the other way.  Female employees of Union Pacific Railroad sued their 
employer for failure to include coverage for prescription contraceptives.177  The district court 
granted the employees’ motion for partial summary judgment, but the Eighth Circuit reversed, 
following instead a case about infertility that found that the PDA referred “only to medical 
conditions associated with ‘pregnancy’ and ‘childbirth.’”178 
The Eighth Circuit found that the district court was wrong in how it framed Union 
Pacific’s exclusion; the circuit court characterized the plan as excluding all kinds of 
contraception, not just prescription contraception.179  It lumped all methods of contraception and 
sterilization into one equal category: neither intrauterine devices nor condoms were covered. 
Therefore, since contraception for neither men nor women was covered by the plan, there was no 
violation of Title VII or the PDA.180  
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit rejected the EEOC’s 2000 decision as unpersuasive.181  
The court drew a distinction between the policies addressed in the decision, which covered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Id. at 1277. 
177 In Re Union Pacific, 479 F.3d at 938. 
178 Id. at 941 (quoting Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996)).  
179 This does not seem like a completely fair characterization, since it seems to differentiate this 
plan from some hypothetical prescription drug plan that covered non-prescription drugs. As the 
dissent pointed out, “that [Union Pacific’s] policy does not provide coverage for condoms is 
unsurprising—Union Pacific has not identified any health insurance policy which would provide 
coverage for non-prescription, contraceptive devices available in drug stores and gas stations 
nationwide.” Id. at 945 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
180 Id. at 944–45. 
181 Id. at 943.  
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sterilizations but not contraceptives, and Union Pacific’s policy, which covered none of those 
things.182  It additionally rejected the comparison between contraception and other preventive 
care.  Finally, it cast doubt on the EEOC’s position, stating that because the “EEOC did not issue 
any guidance on the issue of coverage of prescription contraception until 22 years after the 
enactment of the PDA. . . . [T]he consistency and persuasiveness of the EEOC’s position” was 
questionable.183  
It is unclear the direction this issue will go in other circuits.  In order to reach this 
conclusion, the Eighth Circuit had to reject at least one directly on-point case as well as the 
EEOC’s decision, and instead choose to follow the reasoning in a case that was based on fertility 
procedures instead of prescription contraceptive coverage.184  While employees of religious 
employers may be foreclosed from using Title VII to fight for contraceptive coverage in the 
Eighth Circuit, it may still be possible in the rest of the nation.  
B. RFRA VS. TITLE VII 
An employee of one of the potentially exempt religious employers could use Title VII to 
fight for coverage by establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact.  To do that, he or she 
must:  
[demonstrate] that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes 
a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Id.	  
183 Id.  The Eighth Circuit seems not to have considered Erickson in detail; that court noted that 
up until that point, “no court had been asked to evaluate the common practice of excluding 
contraceptives from a generally comprehensive health plan under Title VII.”  Erickson, 141 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1275.  It seems likely that the EEOC simply never had occasion to address the issue 
until the 2000 decision.  See Law, supra note 159, at 386–91.  
184 See Krauel, 95 F.3d at 681 (holding that denying access to fertility procedures was not a Title 
VII violation).  
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while] the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.185 
 
Once the prima facie case has been established, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to 
show that the practice at issue exists for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business purpose.186  
 These potential arguments would echo the arguments set forth in Erickson and Union 
Pacific at the district level.  The specific employment practice at issue would be the provision of 
a health insurance plan that has a disparately negative impact on women.  While male employees 
and dependents would receive comprehensive prescription drug benefits, female employees and 
dependents would receive less than comprehensive coverage.  As the court pointed out in 
Erickson, “Title VII is measured by evaluating the relative comprehensiveness of coverage.”187  
 Once this was established, the burden would shift to the religious employer to show that 
the exclusion of prescription contraceptives was related to a legitimate business purpose.  Having 
won religious exemptions from the contraceptive mandate, it would be abundantly clear that the 
exclusion of contraception was not business-related.  
 At this point, the court would face a standoff between two important interests: on one 
hand, the religious employer’s right to free exercise; on the other, the employee’s (or 
dependent’s) right to be free from discrimination.  There is a surprising lack of guiding caselaw 
that would indicate the outcome of a Title VII sex discrimination challenge facing a RFRA 
defense.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012); 45A AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 511 
(2014) (citing Spivey v. Beverly Enters, Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
18642 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); Kristie Brooks Smith, A Prima Facie Case of Disparate 
Impact Discrimination Requires Statistically Significant Evidence that a Facially Neutral 
Employment Policy or Practice Adversely Affected a Protected Class, PRAC. INSIGHTS EMP. FL 
0146 (2012).  
187 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. 
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One case is EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, a decision made during the Sherbert era, 
to which RFRA was intended to set back the clock.188  In this case, a Christian school had an 
employment policy of providing health insurance for employees that qualified as heads of 
household.189  The school interpreted “head of household” to mean only single people or married 
men—never married women, who as a matter of scripture could never be the head of a 
household, regardless of which spouse earned more money.190  Therefore, Fremont’s married 
female employees were ineligible for health insurance.191  
A married female employee filed a complaint with the EEOC, which the school answered 
with affirmative defenses based on, among other things, the Free Exercise Clause.192  The school 
claimed that any enforcement of Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination would be a 
violation of its right to free exercise.193 
The court stepped through the three prongs of the Sherbert test. It found that requiring the 
school to provide married women with the same health insurance as married men would not 
substantially burden the school’s religious exercise, since the school had previously eliminated a 
similar provision several years before the instant lawsuit.194  Even if the burden on Fremont’s 
free exercise had been deemed substantial, the court found that eliminating discrimination in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); see also EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Schs., 751 F. Supp. 
700 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (almost identical facts and outcome). 
189 Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d at 1364–65. 
190 Id. at 1365. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 1367. 
194 Id. at 1368. The school had a policy of paying married men a “head of household” monetary 
allowance, but that practice was discontinued because of concerns that the pay disparity was 
“possibly illegal.” Id. at 1364. 
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workplace was a highly compelling government interest: “Congress’ purpose to end 
discrimination is equally if not more compelling than other interests that have been held to 
justify legislation that burdened the exercise of religious convictions.”195  Finally, the court did 
not directly address whether the injunctive relief was actually the least restrictive means; instead 
it found that because the burden on the school’s beliefs was insubstantial, the third prong had 
been satisfied.196  
Another case was Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,197 in which an 
employee was fired for being unmarried and pregnant.198  This controversy took place in 2006, 
which places it in the RFRA era. The plaintiff was a primarily secular teacher at a Christian 
school, handling only one Bible study session per day.199  The school’s administration 
discovered that she was pregnant out of wedlock and did not intend to marry the father, upon 
which knowledge it fired her.200  The employee filed a complaint alleging discrimination under 
the PDA. Moving for summary judgment, the school defended its decision by pointing to an 
employment agreement, which required its employees to conduct themselves in line with 
Seventh-Day Adventist teachings, and pointing out that fornication is a “grievous sin.”201  
While the school did not actually raise a RFRA defense, the court analyzed the case 
through that lens, stating that “RFRA must be deemed the full expression of Congress’ intent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Id. at 1368–69 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)). 
196 Id. at 1369. 
197 440 F. Supp. 2d 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
198 Id. at 214. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 214–15. 
201 Id. at 216. 
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with regard to the religion-related issues before [it].”202  The court found that since the employee 
was not a member of the clergy, she was not covered by the so-called ministerial exception to 
Title VII.203  Because she did not fall into the ministerial exception, the court found that the 
government’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination was sufficient to overcome any 
burden on the school’s religion, and further found that Title VII’s framework was the least 
restrictive means of accomplishing that goal.204 
Cases like Fremont Christian School and Redhead are promising for the employee of the 
ACA-exempted employer, since they illustrate the outcome of a controversy that pits RFRA 
against Title VII.  Although it is true that the substantiality of the employers’ burdens will have 
already been established via the present debate, both of the above cases found that the 
government’s interest in eliminating gender discrimination was compelling enough to override 
the employers’ religious interests.  This result was especially clear in Redhead, in which the 
court stated that without the ministerial exception,205  Title VII was to be viewed as an exception 
to RFRA. If free-exercise burdens on two religious employers did not outweigh the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Id. at 218. 
203 Id. at 220.  The ministerial exception protects Catholic churches, for example, from sex 
discrimination claims from hiring only male priests. Id. 
204 Id. at 221.  The court denied the school’s summary judgment motion because there were 
issues of fact concerning whether the employee had actually been discriminated against based on 
her sex, or whether the school had taken similar action against other employees without regard to 
sex. Id. at 223–24. 
205 The ministerial exception, by definition, will be unavailable to any of the employers that are 
the subject of this Comment. In order to be able to invoke the ministerial exception, the 
organization must have positions equivalent to clergy—in which case, they would have been 
eligible for the religious exemptions from the ACA in the first place.  See 45 C.F.R. § 
147.130(1)(vi)(B)(1)–(4) (laying out the ACA’s exemptions for religious employers—which do 
not include for-profit, secular businesses); Redhead, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 217 (explaining that the 
ministerial exception is meant to protect churches’ selection of their clergy members: “A church 
must retain unfettered freedom in its choice of ministers because ministers represent the church 
to its people.” (emphasis added)). 
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government’s compelling interest in preventing sex discrimination, it seems unlikely that similar 
free-exercise burdens on for-profit, secular employers would be weighed more heavily against 
the same interest.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
A Title VII-based victory for employees in this context would not only be good for the 
individual employee of the religious employer, but for all employees.  Without widespread 
recognition that the PDA’s scope includes contraception, it is up to the states, or even individual 
employers or insurance plans to cover contraception.  With such recognition, the requirement to 
cover contraception in comprehensive prescription plans could become universal.   
However, before employees arrive at this result, many “ifs” must be resolved in the right 
direction.  First, this avenue will be completely unnecessary unless the religious employers win 
their challenges against the mandate—a result that is uncertain at best, given the current circuit 
split.  If they win, then the employees will be able to counter with a Title VII attack if the Court 
finds that the government’s interest in eliminating gender discrimination is sufficiently 
compelling to outweigh a substantial burden on religion and if the Court finds that contraception 
is covered under the PDA. Only after each “if” is resolved as a “yes” will the Court consider 
these diverse statutes together and come to a result that allows employees to claim the 
contraceptive benefits promised by the ACA.  
